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allowed us to test this hypothesis. We found that yields of blocks located in an area with higher 
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and 2014/15, respectively, compared to the yields of blocks under the same management but 
located in an area with lower participation; providing evidence on the efficiency of a well-
performing pest management area to deal with HLB. However, participation in CHMAs has not 
been commensurate with this evidence. We present survey data that provide insights about 
producers’ preferences and attitudes toward the area-wide pest management program. Despite 
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IS AREA-WIDE PEST MANAGEMENT USEFUL? 
THE CASE OF CITRUS GREENING 
 
Introduction 
Citrus greening or Huanglongbing (HLB) is a bacterial disease affecting groves in major citrus 
production areas in the world, including the U.S., Brazil, Asia, Africa, and the Arabian Peninsula 
(USDA-APHIS 2015). Caused by the bacterium Candidatus Liberibacter asiaticus and vectored 
by the Asian citrus psyllid (ACP), HLB is considered to be the most devastating citrus disease 
worldwide (FAO 2015); it affects citrus trees’ vascular system, limiting nutrient uptake, 
negatively affecting yield, fruit size and quality, tree mortality, and cost of production. To date, 
no treatment or management strategy is yet available for growers to cure the disease. 
Florida is the largest orange producing state in the U.S. In fact, Florida alone is the 
second-largest orange juice producer in the world behind Brazil. First found in Florida in 2005, 
HLB has spread rapidly across the state and reached epidemic proportions. It is estimated that, 
on average, 90% of the acreage in a citrus operation in Florida is currently infected with HLB 
(Singerman and Useche 2016). 
Since HLB was found in Florida, orange acreage and yield have decreased by 28% and 
44%, respectively.1 HLB has had a major impact on the profitability of orange production. 
Despite the fact that on-tree prices for oranges have increased from $2.89 to $9.34 a box (USDA-
NASS 2016), the cost of production per box has increased by a higher percentage (CREC 2016a) 
because growers changed the management of their groves in an attempt to slow down the 
disease’s progress and infection rate. The most recent estimates of aggregate economic stakes 
involved are by Hodges et al. (2014). They estimated that the citrus industry total output impact 
in Florida in 2012/13 was $10.68 billion. The authors also estimated the economic impacts of 
HLB over the period 2006/07 through 2013/14 at a loss of $7.80 billion in cumulative industry 
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output, or an annual average loss of $975 million. Their estimates do not include the impact of 
HLB on the fresh citrus fruit market or grapefruit and specialty citrus for processing. Further, 
given that the impact of HLB on yield, production, and growers’ profitability has been more 
pronounced in recent years, we expect current annual HLB-induced losses to be even higher. 
The conventional protocol to manage HLB has consisted of routinely inspecting trees for 
symptoms, as well as controlling the ACP by means of insecticide sprays. If symptoms are found 
on a tree, removal of such tree has been recommended to ensure the elimination of the inoculum 
(Bové 2006). However, growers in Florida have been reluctant to eradicate symptomatic trees 
that were still productive. Therefore, as an alternative management strategy to eradication, they 
started applying foliar applications of nutrients in an attempt to bypass the blockage of phloem 
vessels HLB causes (Spann et al. 2010). Thus, sprays for the vector of the disease, the ACP, and 
enhanced nutritional programs for citrus trees account for the bulk of the increase in the costs of 
producing oranges in Florida. 
 
Pest Mobility and Area-Wide Pest Management 
Management of localized pest populations by individual farmers on a field-by-field basis has 
been the most widely used strategy for pest control (Klassen 2008). However, the effectiveness 
of individual uncoordinated treatments is compromised by the mobility of pests (Vreysen, 
Robinson, and Hendrichs 2007). In fact, recent work on the characteristics and mobility 
capabilities of the ACP call for an area-wide perspective in pest control. While it has been 
hypothesized that the ACP can be carried by air masses over long distances, scientists recently 
found the ACP is capable of traveling 2 kilometers within 12 days (Lewis-Rosenblum et al. 
2015). 
In contrast to individual farm pest management, area-wide pest management is based on 
the premise of addressing the pest population of an entire area, not just a single farm (Faust 
2008). The idea underlying such efforts is that it provides a larger and more lasting effect relative 
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to individual (uncoordinated) farm sprays. Area-wide pest management is also aimed at reducing 
the risk of developing pesticide resistance (Vreysen, Robinson, and Hendrichs 2007). Yu and 
Leung (2006) found evidence that area-wide pest management is superior to individual farm pest 
spraying in the presence of pest mobility. 
It is due to their mobility that pests can also be viewed as common property. Neighboring 
growers share the pest; therefore, crop damage is dependent not only on the individual farm pest 
population, but also on the total pest population in the region. Because of reinfestation from 
neighboring farms, actions on individual farms have little effect on the density of the pest in 
future periods in that farm (Lazarus and Dixon 1984). Thus, individual pest management results 
in under-provision of pest control from a societal perspective (Yu and Leung 2006), creating a 
disparity between private and social optima (Reguev, Gutierrez and Federer 1976). As pointed 
out by Miranowski and Carlson (1986), collective pest-control may result in a higher level of 
welfare relative to individual optimization. 
By coordinating pest control, groups may internalize externalities and increase the 
productivity of pest-control inputs. An example of a successful area-wide pest management 
program in the U.S. is the boll weevil eradication program (Dickerson and Haney 2001). 
However, area-wide pest management programs are not without challenges. Despite the 
desirable technical, economic, and environmental attributes of area-wide pest management, the 
implementation of such programs can encounter resistance due to concerns over methods, free 
riding, general public opposition, and lack of stakeholder participation, among other issues 
(Mumford 2000; Klassen 2000). Ostrom (1990), however, describes a number of cases of 
successfully governed common-pool resources that provide theoretical and empirical alternatives 
to the idea that multiple individuals jointly using a resource cannot avoid the problems that arise 
from their common use of it. 
The purpose of this study is twofold. The first objective consists of analyzing whether 
citrus blocks in area-wide ACP control management programs in Florida — known as Citrus 
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Health Management Areas (CHMAs) — with higher levels of participation have attained greater 
economic benefits. Knowing whether growers in properly functioning CHMAs obtain greater 
profits than growers in CHMAs with poor participation, or who do not participate in CHMAs at 
all, should be important for industry stakeholders and policymakers alike. Given that there is 
currently no cure or successful strategy to manage HLB, should properly functioning CHMAs be 
found to be more profitable, more growers should join and coordinate their efforts. Furthermore, 
policymakers should provide additional incentives for growers to join these area-wide pest 
management programs, and provide support for effective communication and coordination of 
ACP sprays among local citrus growers and grove managers. 
The second objective of the study is to examine citrus growers’ attitudes toward CHMAs. 
Rook and Carlson (1985) examined the producer’s choice between group and individual pest 
control, and argued that if the differential benefit of joining a group is greater than the 
differential cost, then the farmer should join the group. In this regard, Keenan and Burgener 
(2008) argue that since area-wide pest management programs typically rely upon voluntary 
adoption, the new practices must demonstrate their economic advantage. But, is it reasonable to 
assume that a higher expected payoff will suffice to entice growers’ participation? What should 
be included in the definition of cost? Is coordination with neighbors an issue? Olson (1965, p.2) 
argued that “unless the number of individuals is quite small, or unless there is coercion or some 
other special device to make individuals act in their common interest, rational, self-interested 
individuals will not act to achieve their common or group interests.” Better information about 
producers’ preferences and opinions regarding CHMAs should prove useful in designing 
incentive mechanisms to enhance grower participation in CHMAs. 
In the next sections, we first describe the context of area-wide pest management in citrus 
production. Then, we conceptually illustrate how insects and cultural practices of neighboring 
producers can affect each other. The empirical part follows, first analyzing the impact of 
CHMAs with different levels of participation on yields and producer benefits and, second, 
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examining grower participation decisions in CHMAs. Finally, we consider the potential impact 
of the 2016 Citrus Crisis Declaration on area-wide pest management efforts in Florida before 
presenting our conclusions. 
 
Area-Wide Pest Management in Brazil and Florida 
Florida’s main competitor as orange-juice producer is Brazil. The largest orange producing area 
in Brazil is the state of São Paulo, where HLB was found in 2004. To date, the magnitude of the 
impact of HLB in Brazil has not been as dramatic as in Florida, mainly because Brazilian 
growers adopted tree eradication (inoculum removal) at the beginning of the outbreak. However, 
despite its lower spread relative to Florida, HLB still imposes a significant economic burden on 
Brazilian producers in terms of costs of scouting for psyllids, tree removal, and insecticide 
applications (Belasque et al. 2010). 
Bassanezi et al. (2013) showed evidence of the ineffectiveness of combining inoculum 
removal and sprays for ACP in non-area-wide control areas. Contrastingly, they also found that 
combining those strategies in an area-wide management program was effective in reducing the 
disease epidemics. An interesting case study of cooperation for ACP control in Brazil was 
reported by Johnson and Bassanezi (2016), in which a large (corporate) grower started an ACP 
control program beyond his grove borders. Having noticed increasing infection rates on the 
edges of his groves, the grower offered neighboring small growers and backyard citrus 
homeowners – within a 2.5-mile radius of their operations – to spray their trees monthly. 
Alternatively, homeowners were also offered replacement fruit trees other than citrus. According 
to the authors, the grower obtained a return of $30 for every dollar spent in the program during 
the first two years. 
The establishment of an area-wide management program for ACP in the state of Florida 
was proposed as part of the strategic plan for the state’s citrus industry to address HLB (National 
Academy of Sciences 2010). Thus, CHMAs were created around 2010, as voluntary groupings of 
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growers to work cooperatively to coordinate insecticide application timing and mode of action to 
control the spread of ACP across neighboring commercial citrus groves in Florida. CHMAs were 
originally proposed to encompass areas of 10,000 to 50,000 acres. There were 35 active CHMAs 
in Florida in 2012. By 2015 the number of CHMAs had increased to 55, which were distributed 
across 26 counties. However, only 19 of those CHMAs were estimated to be active (CREC 
2016b). 
Besides citrus growers, key participants in CHMAs are the University of Florida’s 
Institute of Food and Agricultural Sciences (UF/IFAS), the Florida Department of Agriculture 
and Consumer Services (Division of Plant Industries), and the U.S. Department of Agriculture’s 
Animal and Plant Health Inspections Service (USDA-APHIS) (through the Citrus Health 
Response Program (CHRP) under Plant Protection and Quarantine (PPQ)). The former 
institution is in charge of facilitating communication of information between researchers and 
scientists, whereas the latter two provide ACP scouting data and mapping of CHMAs. Growers, 
scientists, and UF/IFAS extension agents cooperated to delineate areas. The criteria included 
infection rates, psyllid control practices, tree removal practices, presence of abandoned groves, 
location of groves following organic practices, as well as target markets for the fruit (Rogers et 
al. 2010).  
 
Conceptual Framework 
To illustrate the pest management externality occurring across neighboring farms, consider two 
adjacent growers A and B, and assume all inputs other than pest control are identical. The 
following two equations exemplify the individual profit functions for growers A and B, 
respectively, and highlight that insects and cultural practices of neighboring producers can affect 
each other (Norgaard 1976). 
 
(1) πA = p FA(XA, XB) – r XA, 
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(2) πB = p FB(XA, XB) – r XB, 
 
where p is the price of output, Fi(⋅) denotes the amount produced by grower i, Xi represents the 
level of pest control input used by grower i, and r is the price of such input. Importantly, the 
amount produced by grower A (FA(XA, XB)) depends not only on her amount of input used (XA), 
but also on the amount of input used by grower B (XB), and vice versa. Thus, even though grower 
A can only choose her own pest management inputs, grower B’s input choice also enters into 
grower A’s profit function.  
Typically, producers do not coordinate their use of inputs with their neighbors. That is, 
growers usually choose the amounts of inputs to maximize their own farm’s profits. Thus, since 
growers do not take into account the effect of their choices on their neighbors, the individual 
“myopic” first-order necessary conditions for optimization for growers A and B are represented 
by equations (3) and (4), respectively, 
 
(3) π∂
∂
A
AX
 = p ∂
∂
A
A
F
X
 – r = 0, 
 
(4) π∂
∂
B
BX
 = p ∂
∂
B
B
F
X
 – r = 0. 
 
Equation (3) implies that farmer A will choose the amount of input XA so as to equate her 
individual marginal revenue (p ∂FA/∂XA) to her individual marginal cost (r), disregarding the fact 
that her input choice also affects her neighbor’s marginal revenue (because FB(XA, XB) is a 
function of XA). Equation (4) has an analogous implication regarding farmer B’s input choice. 
Under an area-wide management plan, farmers agree on the pest management program 
and coordinate efforts. Thus, the following joint maximizing problem takes place: 
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(5) 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑋𝑋𝐴𝐴,𝑋𝑋𝐵𝐵 π = p FA(XA, XB) + p FB(XA, XB) – r XA – r XB – c XA – c XB, 
 
where c denotes the cost of the coordination efforts per unit of input. In this instance, the first 
order conditions are given by: 
 
(6) π∂
∂ AX
 = p ∂
∂
A
A
F
X
 – r + (p ∂
∂
B
A
F
X
 – c) = 0, 
 
(7) π∂
∂ BX
 = p ∂
∂
B
B
F
X
 – r + (p ∂
∂
A
B
F
X
 – c) = 0. 
 
By comparing expressions (3) and (4) to (6) and (7), the terms in parentheses that appear in the 
latter two equations denote the additional marginal profits to farmer B and A, respectively, 
derived from the pest control actions in the neighbor’s farm. Thus, if the marginal value product 
of the neighbor’s pest control on the grower’s farm is greater than the cost of coordination (p 
∂FB/∂XA > c, p ∂FA/∂XB > c), the marginal benefit of coordination is positive. Therefore, in this 
case coordinating the use of inputs to control the pest as in (6)-(7) outperforms the solution 
obtained under individual optimization given by (3)-(4). 
To achieve the joint profit maximization outcome under area-wide pest management, all 
(or, at least a majority) of growers may need to optimize in the same manner; that is, participate 
in the area-wide pest management program. Should a significant number of growers in an area 
use the individual maximization criterion instead – making participation fall below a minimum 
threshold – the resulting pest control would be lower compared to the efficient outcome, and 
therefore, a higher pest population should be observed in that area.  
We consulted with entomologists to address the key issue regarding the percentage of 
adoption needed for an area-wide ACP management program to be effective, but they were not 
 
 
10 
aware of any study establishing what the threshold of that majority should be. However, to the 
extent that our data includes CHMAs with different levels of participation, our findings allow us 
to empirically assess the issue. 
 
CHMA Production Data and Analysis 
In this section we test the underlying hypothesis that a CHMA with higher level of participation 
– where more growers coordinate their pest-control management efforts – results in a differential 
yield level compared to an area in which growers do not coordinate as much. Our goal is to 
quantify the differential economic benefit derived from a higher level of participation in 
CHMAs. 
 
Data 
Our production data pertain to two sets of Valencia orange blocks, each located in a different 
CHMA. The first set of data includes six blocks comprising 221 acres located in CHMA 1. The 
second set includes five blocks with a total of 161 acres located in CHMA 2. The data on annual 
yields include production by block for crop years 2008/09 to 2014/15, constituting a panel data 
set for those blocks.  
The two CHMAs are located in neighboring counties in Central Florida and the blocks 
have comparable management and climatic conditions. A salient feature of our data is that the 
same grower owns all the blocks, which have been managed under the same practices (i.e., 
number of sprays, nutritional programs, and fertilizer applications) and have similar 
characteristics in terms of production region, tree age, tree density, and reset plantings.2 
However, participation of fellow growers in the two CHMAs is different. From personal 
communication with the grower who provided the data – and who is also the leader in both 
CHMAs – we learned that roughly 80% of the acreage in CHMA 2 is owned by two large 
corporate growers (in fact, they were formerly sister companies), a factor that certainly 
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contributed to make coordination easier in that CHMA. Contrastingly, land ownership in CHMA 
1 is divided among a higher number of large growers, and some of them are reluctant to 
participate in the program. The CHMA’s captain estimated participation in CHMA 2 to be three 
to five times higher than in CHMA 1. 
Given the characteristics of this data set, the differing “treatment” across blocks is the 
level of participation in the area-wide pest-control management program. Figure 1 shows the 
average number of ACPs found by the USDA-APHIS-PPQ-CHRP in the two CHMAs for which 
we have production data.3 With a few exceptions, it is clear from the figure that CHMA 2 has a 
lower average number of ACPs through the entire series compared to CHMA 1. The production 
data associated with these two CHMAs is analyzed econometrically next. 
 
Analysis  
To assess whether there was any statistically significant difference in the mean level of yield 
attained in the two sets of blocks before CHMAs were established, we conducted a t-test using 
yield data for the year 2008/09. The results, reported in table 1, provide no evidence that yields 
were different between the two sets of blocks previous to the establishment of the CHMAs.  
To determine whether yields between blocks differed after establishing the CHMAs, we 
performed a regression of the yield (in boxes per acre) for block j in year t as a function of 
dummy variables representing crop years 2009/10 through 2014/15, and dummy variables 
interacting crop years and CHMA 2 (CHMA2 × year). In this way, the coefficients of the crop 
year dummy variables encompass the overall incidence that weather, pests and disease had on 
that year’s yield (on CHMA 1). Since there were no extreme weather events during those years, 
it can be sensibly argued that any effect to be found during those years is due to HLB. The 
interaction dummy variables (CHMA2 × year) are intended to capture the differential yield per 
acre of CHMA 2 through time. 
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We analyzed the data using two methods, a random effects model and a pooled OLS 
model with clustered standard errors. The implicit assumption underlying the former model is 
that the unobserved effects are uncorrelated with all explanatory variables. To account for the 
serial correlation in the errors, we computed the random effects estimator (i.e., the feasible 
Generalized Least Squares (GLS) estimator described on pp. 470-471 of Wooldridge 2003). For 
comparative purposes, we also estimated a pooled Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression with 
clustered standard errors, which provides robust standard errors to correlation among errors of 
the same block and heteroscedasticity over time. 
Regression results are shown in table 2. The estimated coefficients are similar in both 
models, and the same variables are found to be statistically significant. However, to be 
conservative, we discuss the results of the random effects model because they provide somewhat 
less favorable results to CHMA 2 than the pooled OLS model with clustered standard errors. All 
of the coefficients from year 2012/13 onwards are negative and significant at standard levels. In 
contrast, the coefficients corresponding to the years prior to 2011/12 are not significantly 
different from zero. The lack of significance for the coefficients corresponding to these earlier 
years is not surprising, because the effects and rate of infection of HLB were not as widespread 
then as they have been in more recent years. In addition, CHMAs were merely starting to be 
organized at the time. However, it is interesting to note that the coefficient for year 2011/12 is 
positive and significant, denoting an increase in yield relative to the base year. This result can be 
explained in the light of the freezes that occurred in 2010/11, which actually ended up causing 
minor damage to the crop, but fears of a shortage in supply caused a 24% increase in the average 
season (on-tree) price. Since growers typically adjust their level of grove caretaking expenses in 
the same direction of price changes, it is likely that the higher yield in 2011/12 was a 
consequence of such behavior. As denoted by the dummy variables year 2012/13, year 2013/14, 
and year 2014/15, yields in CHMA 1 decreased with respect to 2008/09 by 61.0, 140.1, and 
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183.7 boxes per acre, respectively; all three coefficients are both statistically and economically 
significant. 
Figure 2 illustrates the regression results reported in table 1, but in terms of total boxes 
per acre by CHMA. Our finding of significantly higher yields in 2011/12 but lower yields 
starting in 2012/13 in CHMA 1 is in line with the pattern in average Valencia oranges yield 
observed for the state. Figures 3 and 4 show USDA-NASS (2016a) estimates on Florida’s 
average yield and percentage of fruit drop, as well as the number of fruit per box; two of the 
major symptoms of HLB are increased fruit drop and smaller fruit size. 
Another key result from our regression estimation is the magnitude and significance of 
the coefficients corresponding to the interaction variables. The dummy CHMA2 × Year 2012/13 
(CHMA2 × Year 2013/14) [CHMA2 × Year 2014/15] shows that the yield in 2012/13 (2013/14) 
[2014/15] was, on average, 72.5 (134.5) [137.0] boxes per acre higher in blocks located CHMA 
2 compared to those located in a CHMA 1. Therefore, the partial offsetting effect of CHMA 2 
against the negative impact of HLB on yields is increasing over time (at a decreasing rate). This 
finding is consistent with the general idea that benefits from investments in area-wide programs 
accrue over a multi-year time horizon (Klassen 2008).4 
Table 3 reports the differential yields and a measure of the differential annual economic 
benefit accruing to CHMA 2 over CHMA 1. To compute the differential benefit, we multiply the 
differential annual yield obtained above by the corresponding price per box. Thus, we combine -
25.8 (72.5) [134.5] {137.0} boxes per acre with the annual average on-tree price per box for 
processed Valencias in 2011/12 (2012/13) [2013/14] {2014/15}, which was $11 ($8.60) [$10.75] 
{$10.50} (USDA-NASS 2016a). By doing so, we obtain an estimated differential gross 
economic benefit per acre of -$284 ($624) [$1,446] {$1,439} in 2011/12 (2012/13) [2013/14] 
{2014/15}.  
To estimate the direct cost of CHMA participation, we assume the annual program of 
CHMA 2 consists of 8 sprays, which in many cases can be applied aerially and cost $8 per acre 
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each (column 6 of table 3), plus the average cost of materials at $18 (column 7 of table 3). 
Clearly, in this case the cumulative net benefit is positive as shown in column 8 of table 3. 
However, even if a grower needed to perform ground applications, which cost $25 per acre each, 
assuming a stand-alone application (although a tank mix with other chemicals is typically used 
instead to make the application cheaper), the cumulative net benefit is still positive and 
substantial as shown in column 9 of table 3. Note the cumulative net benefit is positive not only 
when considering years in which a positive statistically significant differential benefit was 
observed, but also when considering all years since CHMAs started in 2010/11 and assuming no 
yield differential during the first year. In our example, we also assume zero cost of the spray 
program of CHMA 1, which makes our case stronger and provides evidence of the efficiency of 
CHMA 2 to deal with HLB, and enhance the individual growers’ profitability at a time when 
margins are becoming increasingly narrow 
 
CHMA Participation 
To the best of our knowledge, there are no data available about participation in CHMAs.  
But, as mentioned above, the majority of CHMAs across the state are not active, which is 
startling given the magnitude of our findings (even if they represented a best-case scenario) and 
the impact of the disease across the state.  
The lack of state-wide participation in CHMAs is also startling given that our findings 
suggest that despite a high percentage of compliance is needed for spray coordination to yield 
significant results, participation need not be 100%. CHMAs can neither be characterized as a 
weakest-link public good problem. In such a case a grower’s success hinges on that of the fellow 
grower making the least effort, which was not supported by our results. The weakest-link public 
good characterization of the problem is applicable to the more stringent effort needed for an 
eradication program (Ervin and Frisvold 2016).  
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Even though the CHMA program is neither of the two extreme cases just described, their 
analysis and policy implications can be useful for improving CHMAs participation. Perrings et 
al. (2002) looked at the control of invasive species in multiple countries and argue that if control 
is left to the uncoordinated efforts of individual countries, there will be insufficient control to 
protect the public interest. In their model of the weakest-link public good, Vicary and Sandler 
(2002) allow an agent to provide its own increments to the public good or, alternatively, bolster 
the provision efforts of another agent to raise the overall level of the public good. The authors 
found that when costs differ between agents, in-kind transfers from the low-cost agent to the 
high-cost agent can improve welfare.  
CHMAs themselves are uniform in their cost structure and approach. The main costs 
involved are those of spraying and coordinating; there are no trainings involved. Since the 
communication for coordinating sprays is by email, its cost is given by the time and effort 
required. In addition, the CHMAs captains post general comments on the CHMAs websites, so 
there is no coordination organization establishment, and there are no fixed costs associated with 
it.  
In the case of HLB, however, other aspects of grower heterogeneity should be taken into 
account when designing and implementing a program such as CHMAs. Scientific evidence 
suggests it would be important to take into account grove heterogeneity. Bassanezi (2010) found 
that when HLB symptoms start to be visible in young trees, they can already affect up to 30% of 
the tree canopy, whereas in mature trees they affect less than 5% of the canopy at the onset. In 
addition, Bassanezi and Bassanezi (2008) found that, without HLB control, young trees 
experience a yield reduction two to three years after the onset of symptoms, while for mature 
trees the timeframe is five to ten years after onset. As Bassanezi (2010) points out, the different 
impact of the disease on trees of different ages can present a challenge for HLB management; 
owners of mature groves might be reluctant to adopt control measures and, therefore, impose an 
externality (e.g.: source of inoculum) on neighboring growers willing to plant new trees.  Caplat, 
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Coutts and Buckley (2012) argue that subsidizing the control efforts of the players with the least 
incentive to control increases the confidence of the whole group regarding the usefulness of their 
efforts, and this becomes a self-fulfilling belief. Their results, together with Vicary and Sandler 
(2002), justify the in-kind transfers occurring in Brazil described by Johnson and Bassanezi 
(2016). 
As pointed out by a reviewer, the existence of small-scale “lifestyle farmers”, who could 
be less motivated by profit incentives, may be a challenge for CHMAs participation. In this 
regard, one could (arbitrarily) assume that citrus growers with less than 5 acres represent such 
“lifestyle farmers”. In 2012, 26% of Florida citrus producers (955 out of 3,639) had operations 
with less than 5 acres, but accounted for only 0.3% of the acreage (1,546 out of 539,181 total 
acres) (USDA-NASS 2012). However, the experience with the Boll Weevil Eradication program 
discussed next strongly suggests that abandoned citrus acreage in Florida, which is currently 
estimated at 130,684 acres (USDA-NASS 2016b), constitutes at present a much more serious 
problem.  
The success of the Boll Weevil Eradication program resided in the identification of 
cotton stalks as the major diapausing (overwintering) habitat for the insect (Carlson, Sappie and 
Hammig 1989). In fact, with the exception of the extreme southern Texas area, the only host 
plant for the boll weevil in the U.S. is American cotton. Thus, the coordinated diapause control 
treatments that were part of the eradication effort were directed to destroy overwintering weevil 
populations in cotton plants. The treatments were estimated to suppress 90-95% of the weevil 
population (Smith 1998). The ACP, on the other hand, has multiple host plants (Martini et al. 
2013). So, despite the effectiveness of insecticide applications during the winter for reducing 
ACP populations, they do not prevent resurgence in the Spring. However, there is some evidence 
that suggests that citrus is the primary host during winter, at least in central Florida. Therefore, 
commercial groves with little or no ACP management, such as abandoned groves, may be 
significant overwintering sites and a haven for the ACP (Martini, Pelz-Stelinski and Stelinski 
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2016). There is an initiative from the Florida Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services 
that provides incentives for growers to remove abandoned groves, but it is estimated that the 
funds available will cover the removal of only 15,000 acres.5  
 
CHMA Participation Survey 
Given the dearth of information about grower participation in CHMAs, we recently conducted a 
paper-based survey with Florida citrus growers to learn more about their behavior related to 
CHMAs and their attitudes toward the area-wide pest management program. The survey took 
place at a meeting of Florida citrus growers in April 2016. The purpose of the meeting was to 
summarize the scientific advances and recommended practices to manage HLB. There were 310 
attendees to the event, including growers, researchers, extension agents, media, and state 
officials. The number of growers in the audience was estimated at 140. 
The morning session of the day-long meeting in which growers were surveyed was 
divided into two; the first half was devoted to rootstock tolerance to HLB, after which there was 
a 15-minute break. The second half of the morning session included three talks, one on scion 
tolerance and two on ACP management. The surveys were distributed as people entered the 
room after the coffee break, just before the second half of the morning session started. Thus, 
participants filled out the forms on their own, (mostly) before and in between the talks – as they 
sat waiting for the next talk to start – but perhaps some participants filled them out at the end of 
that second half. The moderator reminded the audience several times during the session to 
complete the survey. Participants handed back the survey once that set of talks was over and 
exited the room to go for lunch. It is unlikely that the sessions had any significant influence on 
their responses because the questions asked in the survey were about the practices growers had 
already been doing and their reasons for doing so (e.g., whether a grower participated in CHMAs 
and the reasons for doing so are unlikely to be influenced by any information provided). 
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The number of completed surveys by growers was 123, giving a response rate of 88%. 
The high response rate was likely due to the fact that a University of Florida merchandise 
clipboard was given to all respondents as a token of appreciation. The growers who responded to 
the survey represented 153,278 acres, which accounts for approximately one-third of the citrus 
acreage in Florida.  
The survey form is reproduced in the Appendix. Succinctly, questions were designed to 
gather information on the following. First, whether the grower was participating in CHMAs at 
the time of the survey. Second, if not participating, growers had to rank their level of agreement 
with statements describing their reasons for not participating. And, if they did participate, 
growers had to rank their level of agreement with statements describing what they thought were 
the main obstacles to increase CHMAs effectiveness. Third, CHMA participants were also asked 
about the level of participation in coordinated sprays.  
When asked about CHMA participation, we obtained 120 responses; 45 (37.5%) of the 
growers stated they do not currently participate, whereas 75 (62.5%) stated they do. Out of the 
75 CHMA participants, 57 answered the question asking the extent to which they participate in 
coordinated sprays. Only 23 growers (40% of those who responded to the question) self-reported 
that they participated in coordinated sprays 100% of the time. The majority of growers (60%) 
stated that they participated less than 100% of the time: 14 (25%) growers participated between 
76 to 99% of the time, 10 (18%) participated between 51 to 75% of the time, and 10 (17%) 
participated less than 50% of the time (see figure 5).6 
The lack of participation in coordinated sprays can be explained, to some extent, by the 
current lack of profitability in citrus production; during the last three seasons, the average Florida 
citrus grower was only able to break even (see figure 6). Moreover, the comparison of annual 
citrus production budgets shows that growers are reducing caretaking inputs, particularly 
insecticide applications (CREC 2016a). However, given the evidence we presented above, 
reducing coordinated sprays might end up imposing a compounding cost, rather than savings, on 
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those growers as well as on their neighbors. In this regard, larger operations might be at an 
advantage compared to smaller operations, since the former are less dependent upon the 
willingness of neighboring growers to participate in CHMAs. 
Another question asked in the survey to non-CHMA participants concerned their reasons 
for not participating in coordinated sprays. Figure 7 shows graphically their responses on a 
Likert scale. The top reason growers mentioned for not participating in CHMAs was that other 
growers do not participate. That is, most growers perceive (correctly or not) that other growers 
are reluctant to coordinate efforts to control the pest. Similarly, Ervin and Frisvold (2016) 
report that for the case of managing resistance of mobile weeds, growers believe such a 
management to be beyond their control and instead dependent on neighbors’ actions, which 
discourages them from proactively managing resistance. This (lack of) assurance that an 
individual’s actions will be matched by fellow growers is what Ostrom (2009) referred to as 
norms/social capital; that is, sharing norms of reciprocity, which is one of the variables Ostrom 
identified as affecting the likelihood of self-organization to achieve sustainable Social-Ecological 
Systems. The second top reason growers mentioned for not participating in CHMAs was “I 
prefer to spray on my own timing,” implying growers’ own reluctance to coordinate efforts with 
other growers. In addition, “too much effort to coordinate” was the reason receiving the third-
largest percentage of “agree” responses from non-CHMA participants. 
The responses from CHMA participants regarding obstacles to increase CHMAs 
effectiveness are summarized in figure 8. Like non-participants, CHMA participants stated 
neighbors not participating as the top obstacle to increase CHMAs effectiveness. Interestingly, as 
depicted in figures 7 and 8, other than their agreement on neighbors’ participation, CHMA 
participants and non-participants diverged on their opinions on whether it is too much effort to 
coordinate; it is too costly to spray; the usefulness of spraying; and the benefit of CHMAs. Of 
course, participants have actual experience regarding spray coordination, have incurred in the 
cost of CHMAs’ sprays, and are aware of the effectiveness of spraying and its benefits. 
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However, the divergence of opinion between participants and non-participants makes the latter’s 
motives for not joining stand out even further. 
An additional reason argued by some growers for not participating in CHMAs is that, 
given the current widespread level of infection across the state, they do not believe in the 
usefulness of spraying for the ACP. Survey results included in figure 7 help illustrate this point; 
the figure shows that a total of 37% of non-CHMA participants agree or somewhat agree with 
the statement that it is no longer useful to spray for the ACP.  
Overall, it is clear from the survey responses that (lack of) coordination has been a major 
obstacle for the establishment and correct operation of CHMAs. Our hypothesis is that strategic 
uncertainty — defined as uncertainty regarding the actions and beliefs of others — also plays a 
key role in undermining CHMAs participation. As Morris and Shin (2002, p. 2) put it, “the idea 
is that even a small seed of doubt concerning the ability of the players to close ranks to achieve 
the good outcome will start to undermine the resolve of an individual player to stick to the 
cooperative strategy, and opt out”. In another manuscript we are working on, we have analyzed 
data of a choice experiment that shows that the coordination requirement (i.e.: percentage of 
growers needed to coordinate) as well as the number of growers in a CHMA adversely affect 
their participation decisions. Thus, we think there is a behavioral component involved. 
 
Potential Impact on CHMAs of the 2016 Citrus Crisis Declaration 
The cultural practices of Florida citrus growers have changed significantly in the last 10 years in 
an attempt to deal with HLB, but none has worked so far. It is highly unlikely that solely 
improving area-wide spray coordination efforts on groves that already show severe HLB-induced 
tree decline would change the outlook for those groves. In March 2016, the Florida 
Commissioner of Agriculture declared a citrus crisis under the Emergency Exemptions 
provisions of the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FDACS 2016). The main 
goal of the declaration was to allow growers across the state to use streptomycin and 
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oxytetracycline in foliar applications to attempt to enhance the health of trees infected with HLB. 
Given that the expected enhancement of streptomycin and oxytetracycline on HLB-infected trees 
is not yet proven — particularly given that most of the compound sprayed is not absorbed by the 
tree but lost in the environment or leeched into the soil — the citrus crisis declaration provides 
yet more evidence of the dire situation faced by Florida citrus growers due to HLB. It is precisely 
due to the gravity of the situation growers are facing that they are willing to try any alternative 
that they believe shows promise. So it was growers, through their associations, that were pushing 
to obtain approval for the use of streptomycin and oxytetracycline in Florida groves. 
Quite interestingly, ACP population data suggest that the declaration has had the 
unintended effect of increasing the ACP infestation. As shown in figure 1, the two CHMAs 
analyzed above experienced a substantial spike in the average number of ACP per block in 2016, 
reaching record levels in both CHMAs. More importantly, figure 9 shows that this spike 
occurred statewide, and that the average ACP population in Florida achieved an all-time high in 
2016. Significantly, such spike occurred shortly after the citrus crisis announcement allowing for 
the use of streptomycin and oxytetracycline in Florida, which suggests that growers are likely 
substituting insecticide applications with streptomycin and oxytetracycline. This substitution 
would imply that growers are getting away from the strategic uncertainty that CHMAs pose, and 
taking instead the risky/uncertain outcome that the self-managed strategy of applying 
streptomycin and oxytetracycline present (which they evidently perceive to be lower). 
The basic tenet of allowing for the use of streptomycin and oxytetracycline to manage 
HLB (i.e., that they might improve the condition of the trees infected with HLB) requires little 
coordination among growers. Thus, if streptomycin and oxytetracycline are eventually found 
unable to enhance the health of HLB-infected trees, encouraging its use now may severely 
hamper the chances to control HLB, not only because of the compounds’ ineffectiveness, but 
also because of their lack of reliance on the coordination required for CHMAs’ success. 
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Conclusions and Policy Implications 
In our analysis of data on yields of Valencia oranges from blocks located in two CHMAs with 
different levels of participation, we found that the number of boxes per acre decreased 
significantly from 2012/13 through 2014/15. Since there were no extreme weather events such as 
hurricanes or freezes during those years, we argue that those variables capture mainly the 
increasing negative impact of HLB on yields. We also found that the yields of blocks located in 
the CHMA with higher participation were 73 (28%), 135 (73%) and 137 (98%) boxes per acre 
(percent) higher in 2012/13, 2013/14, and 2014/15, respectively compared to the yields of the 
blocks located in the CHMA with lower participation during those same years. This translates 
into a gross differential benefit per acre of $624, $1,446, and $1,439 in 2012/13, 2013/14, and 
2014/15, respectively. Thus, the partial offsetting effect found in the higher participation CHMA 
against the negative impact of HLB on yields has increased over time. 
Our findings provide evidence on the efficiency of a well-performing CHMA to deal with 
HLB. However, participation in CHMAs has not been commensurate with this evidence; 
CHMAs present growers with strategic uncertainty. We found that the top reason stated by 
growers for not participating in CHMAs was their belief about their neighbors not participating. 
The second most important reason given for not participating in CHMAs was the grower’s 
preference for self-reliance in spraying. These results help explain why participation in CHMAs 
and, therefore, their success is not as widespread across Florida as one would expect. Despite the 
relatively high benefit we found CHMAs can provide, the strategic uncertainty involved in 
relying on neighbors seems to impose too high of a cost for most growers, who end up not 
coordinating sprays. Florida’s recent approval of the use of streptomycin and oxytetracycline to 
manage HLB presented growers with a new alternative to combat the disease. It is still unclear 
whether such compounds will prove effective against HLB, but it seems they might have had an 
unfortunate side effect on CHMAs, the one strategy for which we found evidence that works to 
manage HLB. Thus, efforts should be made at the state level not only to prevent the cooperation 
 
 
23 
among growers achieved in some areas from vanishing, but also to increase coordination to 
threshold levels that make cooperation among producers efficient against HLB across all citrus 
growing regions in Florida. 
A mandatory component in CHMAs – that replaces its current voluntary character – 
along with some form of enforcement seems crucial to overcome the issues of heterogeneity of 
growers and their groves, abandoned acreage, as well as the side effect of streptomycin and 
oxytetracycline on CHMAs. Faust (2008) summarizes the characteristics of an area-wide pest 
management program envisioned by Edward F. Knipling – a strong proponent of regional pest 
management; it included a mandatory component to ensure the success of the program due to the 
suboptimal level of pest management observed under voluntary programs. Ostrom (1990) 
identified eight design principles that characterized robust common-pooled resource institutions; 
monitoring and graduated sanctions are two of them. Thus, users who violate the rules are 
assessed a sanction. In this context, Levi (1988) argues that strategic actors comply with rules 
when they can expect others to comply as well, because those who do not are subject to coercion. 
As suggested by a reviewer, a possible way to ensure sufficient levels of participation to 
achieve the highest social welfare is the implementation of a smart regulatory approach, e.g., one 
based on performance. While such an approach might potentially have the added advantage of 
decreasing the growth in use of chemicals in citrus production, it would require growers to 
disclose and self-report how good (or not) they are doing (i.e., report yields) to be able to 
establish the subsidies and payments based on performance. The introduction of this change to 
CHMAs is likely to be resisted by growers; it would require a high degree of coercion (to collect 
the data) and a significant monitoring effort (to prevent growers from understating their self-
reported performance). A performance-based approach may also be difficult to implement 
because CHMAs are not the only strategy growers are taking against HLB. Thus, the scheme 
would need to be very elaborate to avoid confounding the effects of different strategies and 
penalizing adopters of those other strategies. For example, if a grower decides to stop replanting 
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trees, as some are already doing – e.g., until an HLB-resistant tree variety is released – his/her 
yields will start to decrease. So assessing performance assuming only a CHMA effect would 
penalize the grower who is replanting. 
Based on our findings and the existing related literature, we recommend the CHMA 
scheme to be modified as follows. First, we propose CHMAs to become mandatory in 
commercial citrus groves across the state. Growers would be assessed charges for the sprays on a 
per acre basis. As it was the case for the Boll Weevil Eradication Program, the use of subsidies 
may contribute to reduce the potential controversy that mandatory CHMA sprays may generate. 
Second, we also recommend the introduction of monitoring and sanctions for non-complying 
growers. Third, the introduction of in-kind transfers among growers seems a plausible approach 
to complement CHMAs and achieve appropriate levels of participation. Such an approach has 
demonstrated economic benefits in Brazil, and would be useful to complement governmental 
efforts in the removal of abandoned acreage. The government could further incentivize growers 
to make such transfers by declaring them eligible for some form of tax-break or other appropriate 
subsidies. Fourth, as suggested by Pretty et al. (2001), we recommend the use of processes that 
support communication and learning among farmers as an incentive for them to adopt 
sustainable practices more permanently, rather than only during the duration of the program. In 
addition, according to Klassen (2000), successful adoption of an area-wide pest management 
scheme may also enable producers to pool resources to use technologies, information systems, 
and expertise that are otherwise too expensive for individual producers. The pooling of resources 
would, for example, enable improved specialized analysis of pest immigration patterns and help 
implement approaches to prevent or retard the development of insecticide resistance  
The above policy changes would benefit not only Florida citrus growers but also all 
Florida residents. The impact of the significant increase in chemical use in the last few years 
across the industry has not yet been measured nor analyzed. Less-intensive ACP control 
programs applied area-wide have been found to be as efficient as, or more efficient than, more 
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intensive programs in non-area-wide control areas (Bassanezi et al. 2013). There are long-term 
environmental benefits derived from reducing insecticides applications (Ervin and Frisvold 
2016). Furthermore, CHMAs success may lower the overall use of other chemicals, including 
nutritionals and fertilizer.  
Finally, our survey findings suggest that additional research is needed to learn more about 
the transaction costs of implementing the CMHA approach. We hypothesize that strategic 
uncertainty plays a key role on growers’ participation decisions in area-wide pest management 
programs. When describing the processes of organizing and governing Common Pool Resources, 
Ostrom (1990) pointed out that uncertainty reduction is costly and never fully accomplished. She 
also noted that the uncertainty derived from strategic behavior remains even after acquiring 
knowledge about the resource system. Over time, agents increase their understanding of the 
physical world and what to expect from the behavior of other agents. Given the devastating 
effect of HLB in Florida and its incipient spread to other U.S. citrus producing regions, further 
research is needed to help speed up the learning process regarding the factors that influence the 
strategic behavior of agents in the context of area-wide pest management areas. 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
26 
References 
Bassanezi, R.B., L.H. Montesino, N. Gimenes-Fernandes, P.T. Yamamoto, T.R. Gottwald, L. 
Amorim, and A. Bergamin Filho. 2013. Efficacy of Area-Wide Inoculum Reduction and 
Vector Control on Temporal Progress of Huanglongbing in Young Sweet Orange Plantings. 
Plant Diseases 97:789-796. 
Bassanezi, R.B. 2010. Epidemiology of Huanglongbing and its Implications on Disease 
Management. Fundecitrus, working paper. Available at: 
http://calcitrusquality.baremetal.com/wp-content/uploads/2009/05/Epidemiology-of-HLB-
and-its-implications-on-disease-management-Bassanezi-2010.pdf 
Bassanezi, R.B., and R.C. Bassanezi. 2008. An Approach to Model the Impact of Huanlongbing 
on Citrus Yield. Proceedings of the 2008 International Research Conference on 
Huanglongbing, Orlando, pp. 301-304.  
Belasque, J.Jr., R.B. Bassanezi, P.T. Yamamoto, A.J. Ayres, A. Tachibana, A.R. Violante, A. 
Tank Jr., F. Di Giorgi, F.E.A. Tersi, G.M. Menezes, J. Dragone, R.H. Jank Jr., and J.M. 
Bové. 2010. Lessons from Huanglongbing Management in São Paulo State, Brazil. Journal 
of Plant Pathology 92(2):285-302. 
Bové, J.M. 2006. Huanlongbing: A Destructive, Newly-Emerging, Century-Old Disease of 
Citrus. Journal of Plant Pathology 88(1):7-37. 
Caplat, P., S. Coutts, and Y.M. Buckley. 2012. Modeling Population Dynamics, Landscape 
Structure, and Management Decisions for Controlling the Spread of Invasive Plants. Annals 
of the New York Academy of Sciences 1249(1):72-83. 
Carlson GA, G. Sappie, and M. Hammig. 1989. Economic Returns to Boll Weevil Eradication. 
Resource and Technology Division, Economic Research Service, USDA, Agricultural 
Economic Report No. 621.  
Citrus Research and Education Center (CREC), University of Florida. 2016a. Citrus Enterprise 
Budgets. 
 
 
27 
Citrus Research and Education Center (CREC), University of Florida. 2016b. Citrus Health 
Management Areas Website. Available at: 
http://www.crec.ifas.ufl.edu/extension/chmas/chma_websites.shtml# 
Dickerson, W.A., and P.B. Haney. 2001. A Review and Discussion of Regulatory Issues. In Boll 
Weevil Eradication in the United States Through 1999, ed. W.A. Dickerson, A.L. Brashear, 
J.T. Brumley, F.L. Carter, and W.J. Grefenstette, 137-156. Memphis, TN: The Cotton 
Foundation Publisher. 
Ervin, D. E., and G.B. Frisvold. 2016. Community-Based Approaches to Herbicide-Resistant 
Weed Management: Lessons from Science and Practice. Weed Science, 64(sp1), 609-626. 
Faust, R.M. 2008. General Introduction to Areawide Pest Management. In Areawide Pest 
Management Theory and Implementation, ed. O. Koul, G.W. Cuperus, and N. Elliott, 1-14. 
Cambridge, MA: CAB International. 
Florida Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services (FDACS). 2016. Available at: 
http://www.crec.ifas.ufl.edu/extension/greening/PDF/Crisis%20Declaration--%203-7-
2016.pdf 
Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO). 2015. Regional Management 
of Huanglongbing (HLB) in Latin America and the Caribbean. Available at: 
http://www.fao.org/americas/perspectivas/hlb/en/ 
Hodges, A.W., M. Rahmani, T.J. Stevens, and T.H. Spreen. 2014. Economic Impacts of the 
Florida Citrus Industry in 2012-13. Food & Resource Economics Department, University of 
Florida. Available at: http://www.fred.ifas.ufl.edu/pdf/economic-impact 
analysis/Economic_Impacts_Florida_Citrus_Industry_2012-13.pdf 
Johnson, E. and R. Bassanezi. 2016. HLB in Brazil: What’s Working and What Florida Can Use. 
Citrus Industry, June. 
 
 
28 
Keenan, S.P. and P.A. Burgener. 2008. Social and Economic Aspects of Areawide Pest 
Management. In Areawide Pest Management Theory and Implementation, ed. O. Koul, G.W. 
Cuperus, and N. Elliott, 97-116. Cambridge, MA: CAB International. 
Klassen, W. 2008. Area-Wide Insect Pest Management. In Encyclopaedia of Entomology, Vol. 2, 
ed. J.L. Capinera, 266-282. Springer, Dordrecht. 
Klassen, W. 2000. Area-Wide Approaches to Insect Pest Management: History and Lessons. In 
Proceedings: Area-Wide Control of Fruit Flies and Other Insect Pests. International 
Conference on Area-Wide Control of Insect Pests, and the 5th International Symposium on 
Fruit Flies of Economic Importance, 28 May-5 June 1998, Penang, Malaysia, ed. K.H. Tan, 
21-38. Penerbit Universiti Sains Malaysia, Pulau Pinang, Malaysia. 
Lazarus, W.F., and B.L. Dixon. 1984. Agricultural Pests as Common Property: Control of the 
Corn Rootworm. American Journal of Agricultural Economics 66: 456-465. 
Levi, M. 1988. Of Rule and Revenue. Berkeley and Los Angeles, CA: University of California 
Press. 
Lewis-Rosenblum, H., X. Martini, S. Tiwari, and L.L. Stelinki. 2015. Seasonal Movement 
Patterns and Long-Range Dispersal of Asian Citrus Psyllid in Florida Citrus. Journal of 
Economic Entomology 1-8. DOI: 10.1093/jee/tou008 
Martini, X., T. Addison, B. Fleming, I. Jackson, K.S. Pelz-Stelinski, and L.L. Stelinski. 2016. 
Occurrence of Diaphorina Citri (Hemiptera: Liviidae) in an Unexpected Ecosystem: The 
Lake Kissimmee State Park Forest, Florida. Florida Entomologist (96) 2: 178-186 
Martini, X., K.S. Pelz-Stelinski, and L.L. Stelinski. 2013. Factors Affecting the Overwintering 
Abundance of the Asian Citrus Psyllid (Hemiptera: Liviidae) in Florida Citrus (Sapindales: 
Rutaceae) Orchards. Florida Entomologist (99) 2: 658-660 
Miranowski, J.A., and G. Carlson. 1986. Economic Issues in Public and Private Approaches to 
Preserving Pest Susceptibility. In Pesticide Resistance: Strategies and Tactics for 
 
 
29 
Management, Committee on Strategies for the Management of Pesticide Resistance Pest 
Populations. Washington, DC: National Academy Press. 
Morris, S., and H.S. Shin. 2002. Measuring Strategic Uncertainty. Available at: 
http://www.princeton.edu/~hsshin/www/barcelona.pdf 
Mumford, J. 2000. Economics of Area-Wide Pest Control. In Proceedings: Area-Wide Control 
of Fruit Flies and Other Insect Pests. International Conference on Area-Wide Control of 
Insect Pests, and the 5th International Symposium on Fruit Flies of Economic Importance, 
28 May-5 June 1998, Penang, Malaysia, ed. K.H. Tan, 39-47. Penerbit Universiti Sains 
Malaysia, Pulau Pinang, Malaysia. 
National Academy of Sciences. 2010. Strategic Planning for the Florida Citrus Industry: 
Addressing Citrus Greening Disease. Available at: http://dels.nas.edu/resources/static-
assets/materials-based-on-reports/reports-in-brief/citrus_greening_report_brief_final.pdf. 
Retrieved: 08/04/2016. 
Norgaard R.B. 1976. Integrating Economics and Pest Management. In Integrated Pest 
Management, ed. J.L. Apple and R.F. Smith, 63-76. New York: Plenum. 
Olson, M. 1965. The Logic of Collective Action. Public Goods and the Theory of Groups. 
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
Ostrom, E. 1990. Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action. 
Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.  
Ostrom, E. 2009. A General Framework for Analyzing the Sustainability of Socio-Ecological 
Systems. Science 325:419-422. 
Perrings, C., M. Williamson, E.B. Barbier, D. Delfino, S. Dalmazzone, J. Shogren, and A. 
Watkinson. 2002. Biological Invasion Risks and the Public Good: An Economic Perspective. 
Conservation Ecology 6(1):1. Available at: http://www.consecol.org/vol6/iss1/art1/ 
 
 
30 
Pretty, J., C. Brett, D. Gee, R. Hine, C. Mason, J. Morison, M. Rayment, G. Van Der Bijl, and T. 
Dobbs. 2001. Policy Challenges and Priorities for Internalising the Externalities of Modern 
Agriculture. Journal of Environmental Planning and Management 44(2):263-283  
Reguev, U., A.P. Gutierrez, and G. Federer. 1976. Pests as a Common Property Resource: A 
Case Study of Alfalfa Weevil Control. American Journal of Agricultural Economics 58:186-
197. 
Rogers, M.E., J.K. Burns, D.L. Gunter, T. Turpen, R. Gaskalla, R.A Noah, P.A. Mears, M. 
Albritton, and M.W. Sparks. Developing Citrus Health Management Areas. Available at: 
http://flcitrusmutual.com/files/2763abb6-4818-4d72-9.pdf  
Rook, S.P. and G.A. Carlson. 1985. Participation in Pest Management Groups. American Journal 
of Agricultural Economics 67:563-566. 
Singerman, A., and P. Useche. 2016. Impact of Citrus Greening on Citrus Operations in Florida. 
University of Florida/IFAS, EDIS document FE 983. Available at: 
https://edis.ifas.ufl.edu/fe983 
Smith, J. W. 1998. Boll Weevil Eradication: Area-Wide Pest Management. Annals of the 
Entomological Society of America, 91(3), 239-247. 
Spann, T.M., R.A. Atwood, M.M. Dewdney, R.C. Ebel, R. Ehsani, G. England, S.H. Futch, T. 
Gaver, T. Hurner, C. Oswalt, M.E. Rogers, F.M. Roka, M.A. Ritenour, M. Zekri, B.J. 
Boman, K. Chung, M.D. Danyluk, R. Goodrich-Schneider, K.T. Morgan, R.A. Morris, R.P. 
Muraro, P. Roberts, R.E. Rouse, A.W. Schumann, P.A. Stansly, and L.L. Stelinski. 2010. 
IFAS Guidance for Huanglongbing (Greening) Management. University of Florida/IFAS. 
EDIS document HS 1165. Available at: http://edis.ifas.ufl.edu/hs1165 
USDA-NASS. 2016a. Florida Citrus Statistics 2014-2015 
USDA-NASS. 2016b. Citrus Abandoned Acreage in Florida. Available at: 
https://www.nass.usda.gov/Statistics_by_State/Florida/Publications/Citrus/Abandoned_Acre
age/CitAA16.pdf 
 
 
31 
USDA-NASS. 2012. Quick Stats, Census data. 
USDA-APHIS. 2015. Citrus Greening Background. Available at: 
https://www.aphis.usda.gov/aphis/ourfocus/planthealth/plant-pest-and-disease-
programs/pests-and-diseases/citrus-health-response-program/ct_background. Retrieved on 
08/04/2016. 
Vicary, S., and T. Sandler. 2002. Weakest-Link Public Goods: Giving In-Kind or Transferring 
Money. European Economic Review 46(8):1501-1520. 
Vreysen, M.J.B., A.S. Robinson, and J. Hendrichs. 2007. Area-Wide Integrated Pest 
Management (AW-IPM): Principles, Practice and Prospects. In Area-Wide Control of Insect 
Pests: From Research to Field Implementation, ed. M.J.B. Vreysen, A.S. Robinson, and J. 
Hendrichs, 3-33. Springer. 
Wooldridge, J.M. 2003. Introductory Econometrics: A Modern Approach. Thompson South-
Western. 
Yu, R., and P. Leung. 2006. Optimal Pest Management: A Reproductive Pollutant Perspective. 
International Journal of Pest Management 52(3):155-166. 
 
  
 
 
32 
Appendix 
 
2016 Florida Growers Survey 
1) Which of the following best describes your current responsibilities? (choose all that apply) 
      Grove owner       Production manager/Foreman        Caretaker       Other:___________________ 
2) Do you currently participate in CHMAs sprays?      Yes       No 
If you answered NO, indicate which of the following explain your reasons for not participating: 
           Disagree                    Somewhat Agree                    Agree              
    Neighbors do not participate  1     2          3      4          5                  N/A         
    Too much effort to coordinate sprays 1      2          3   4          5                  N/A   
    It is too costly to spray          1       2          3  4          5                  N/A 
    No longer useful to spray for ACP 1 2          3          4          5                  N/A 
    I prefer to spray on my own timing 1      2          3          4          5                  N/A                   
    Plan on exiting the industry soon  1      2          3          4          5                 N/A 
    Benefit (yield) not worth it  1       2          3          4          5                 N/A 
 
If you answered YES, indicate what you think are the main obstacles to increase CHMAs effectiveness against 
HLB: 
           Disagree                 Somewhat Agree                        Agre 
    Neighbors do not participate           1      2        3          4            5                N/A 
    Too much effort to coordinate sprays 1              2        3          4            5                N/A   
    It is too costly to spray                   1      2        3          4                         5                N/A 
    Decreasingly effective to spray for ACP 1      2        3          4            5                N/A 
    Benefit (yield) decreasing  1      2        3          4            5                N/A 
 
3) How many times did you spray for ACP during 2015/16 (without including CHMAs sprays)?_________ 
 
4) How many times did you participate in coordinated sprays as part of CHMAs during 2015/16?_________ 
 
5) What percentage of times did you participate in coordinated sprays when an email from the CHMAs captain was 
sent during 2015/16?___________% 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
(circle one number per row) 
(circle one number per row) 
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Endnotes 
1. Even though HLB was first found in Florida in 2005, the initial figures we use next to 
illustrate its impact on the industry correspond to 2004 because they provide a better estimate of 
the scale of the industry prior to HLB. Florida was hit by four hurricanes between August and 
September of 2004. A little over a year later, in October 2005, another hurricane hit the state. 
Those hurricanes had a significant negative impact on yield and, therefore, production of oranges 
statewide in 2005, 2006, and 2007. 
2. Characteristics for which we do not have data include soil quality and soil pH. We are not 
aware of differing biophysical conditions that might influence the incidence of ACP between the 
two areas. The major factors (i.e., cultural practices) are controlled for by blocks having identical 
management. 
3. The USDA-APHIS-PPQ-CHRP started scouting and monitoring ACPs within CHMAs in 
August 2011. 
4. The differential yield of CHMA 2 with respect to CHMA 1 is increasing through time, likely 
due to the biophysical phenomenon that higher populations of ACP result in bacterial re-
infection of trees by ACP (therefore, the higher level of bacteria in trees makes their yield 
decrease more sharply through time). While area-wide ACP management reduces ACP 
populations, it does not eliminate HLB. Thus, despite the bacterial load in trees located in 
CHMA 2 being presumably lower, HLB still causes those trees to decline, though at a lower rate. 
5. Personal communication with the person in charge of the program. See also: 
http://www.freshfromflorida.com/Divisions-Offices/Plant-Industry/Agriculture-Industry/Citrus-
Health-Response-Program/Abandoned-Grove-Initiative  
6. Unfortunately, there are no data on patterns of CHMA participation that we could compare our 
sample to. 
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Figure 1. Average number of ACP per block by CHMA 
 
 
Source: USDA-APHIS-PPQ-CHRP. 
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Figure 2. Regression results: yield per acre by CHMA and gross differential benefit 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
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Figure 3. Yield and fruit drop of Valencia oranges in Florida 
 
Source: USDA-NASS. 
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Figure 4. Yield and fruit size of Valencia oranges in Florida 
 
Source: USDA-NASS. 
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Figure 5. Level of CHMA participation 
 
Source: Authors’ survey results. 
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Figure 6. Revenue and cost of production per acre in Central Florida 
 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
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Figure 7. Reasons for not participating in CHMAs stated by non-CHMA participants 
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Source: Authors’ survey results. 
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Figure 8. Obstacles to increase CHMA effectiveness stated by CHMA participants 
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Figure 9. Average ACP population in the state of Florida 
 
Source: USDA-APHIS-PPQ-CHRP. 
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Table 1. T-test on equality of yield means for the year 2008/09 
 
Group Observations Mean 
CHMA 1 6 313.13 
CHMA 2 5 337.39 
Difference 11 -24.26 
   
Probability of alternative hypothesis (Ha): 
Ha: Difference < 0 Ha: Difference ≠ 0 Ha: Difference > 0 
Probability(T < t) = 0.23 Probability(|T| > |t|) = 0.45 Probability(T > t) = 0.77 
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Table 2. Regression Results on Valencia Oranges Yields 
Variable Random Effects Model 
Pooled OLS with 
Clustered Standard Errors 
Year 2009/10 23.6 15.4 
 (1.39) (0.80) 
Year 2010/11 -16.9 -25.1 
 (-0.99) (-1.30) 
Year 2011/12 42.0** 33.8** 
 (2.47) (2.37) 
Year 2012/13 -61.0*** -69.2*** 
 (-3.59) (-3.17) 
Year 2013/14 -140.1*** -148.3*** 
 (-8.24) (-5.50) 
Year 2014/15 -183.7*** -191.9*** 
 (-10.80) (-7.33) 
CHMA2 × Year 2009/10 -19.0 -0.9 
 (-0.78) (0.03) 
CHMA2 × Year 2010/11 26.4 44.5 
 (1.09) (0.96) 
CHMA2 × Year 2011/12 -25.8 -7.7 
 (-1.06) (-0.20) 
CHMA2 × Year 2012/13 72.5*** 90.6** 
 (2.98) (2.37) 
CHMA2 × Year 2013/14 134.5*** 152.6*** 
 (5.54) (3.23) 
CHMA2 × Year 2014/15 137.0*** 155.1*** 
 (5.64) (4.35) 
Intercept 324.2*** 324.2*** 
 (17.83) (19.81) 
Observations 77 77 
Number of years 7 7 
Wald 𝜒𝜒122  300.4  
Prob > 𝜒𝜒122  0.0  
R2  0.60 
t-statistics within parentheses. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table 3. Differential yields and benefit for CHMA 2 over CHMA 1 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
 
Yield 
CHMA 1 
Yield 
CHMA 2 
Yield 
Difference 
CHMA 2 - 
CHMA 1 
On-Tree 
Price*  
Gross 
Differential  
Benefit  
Application 
cost  Materials 
Cost  
Net 
Differential 
Benefit if 
Aerial 
Application  
Net 
Differential 
Benefit if 
Ground 
Application  
 Aerial Ground 
 (boxes/acre) ($/box) ($/acre) 
2010/11      64 200 144 -208 -344 
2011/12 366 340 -25.8 11.00 -284 64 200 144 -492 -628 
2012/13 263 336 72.5 8.60 624 64 200 144 416 280 
2013/14 184 319 134.5 10.75 1446 64 200 144 1238 1102 
2014/15 141 278 137.0 10.50 1439 64 200 144 1231 1095 
    Cumulative 3224 320 1000 720 2184 1504 
Source: Authors’ calculations and USDA-NASS (2016a) where indicated with an asterisk. 
